The Non-Russian SSRs and nuclear weapons

There is one argument, especially after the 2022 invasion, about Ukraine (and the other non-Russian ex-SSRs) and nuclear weapons. This goes: They gave up their nuclear weapons in exchange for largely meaningless and unenforceable diplomatic agreements, which was a mistake that Ukraine paid for and Kazakhstan might have.

Many informed nuclear commentators have pointed out that the launch codes/infrastructure were still in Russian hands, that Ukraine had no actual control, and that the ICBMs in particular were ill-positioned for deterring their former owners. This is all accurate, as is the staggering cost of making a usable nuclear program during a time of massive political and economic upheaval (Ukraine’s implosion in the 1990s made Russia’s look like a modest recession, and Kazakhstan had effectively no army of its own immediately after independence)

But there is another opposite fallacy, which is that the decision was more or less out of their hands. Because all the nuclear weapons were under Russian control, there was no real choice involved. This is also flawed. The nuclear weapons weren’t immediately usable, but to act like there was a Ward Of Russianism on them is wrong. Ukraine had extensive infrastructure and science on its territory (including a missile plant), while Kazakhstan’s uranium industry meant that it was already over the biggest hump for a usable bomb-the materials.

So it was not technically impossible for the non-Russian SSRs to maintain a nuclear weapons program. You can argue that it was politically and economically so, and probably correctly. But it was not a technical issue. The republics had agency, and they likely prevented a far earlier Russian invasion by relenting.

2 thoughts on “The Non-Russian SSRs and nuclear weapons

  1. Melody Amber's avatar Melody Amber

    Not to necro this post, but you’re wrong about Ukraine’s ability to maintain an arsenal. Simply having some elements of a nuclear fuel cycle as Ukraine did does not give you the capacity to maintain the weapons long-term. If you read the DTRA history of CTR it’s clear that warheads had long been decaying and forcing units out of combat readiness by the time the 1994 Trilateral Agreement was made. Additionally, if you read the Kataev Archive document on Ukraine and nuclear weapons, he argues very confidently that Ukraine doesn’t have the technical capacity to maintain the warheads.

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