So WW3 1987 talked about a classic counterfactual: “What if Iraq attacked south in August 1991 against Desert Shield”? Actual Gulf War commanders have had differing opinions, and of course the context matters. I’ve done a bit of simming in Command Modern Operations, and have come to the conclusion that, well, it would have only been troublesome for the coalition by the standards of the actual war’s total squash. Why? Three main reasons.

1. Air power is more powerful and immediately influential. Though I’m an air power skeptic, disrupting an offensive in the open is one of the easiest things for air power to do, especially one that’s trained for a much harder Fuldapocalypse.
2. Geography and politics. That literally every country from Qatar down to Oman was part of the coalition means that the Iraqis literally can’t move far enough to stop the landing of reinforcements in friendly territory of some kind.
3. Historical context. The Iraqis who didn’t think the takeover of Kuwait was a big deal historically had no contingency plans to move farther south. So they’d be winging it, and that’s not exactly a recipe for success given the other problems.