Review: Battledrills for Chinese Mobile Warfare

Battledrills for Chinese Mobile Warfare

Against my better judgement, I got another H. John Poole book. The title made me naively think “oh, this could be a set of practical drills approached from a different perspective.” So like any H. John Poole book, this is about 5% reasonable well-thought out arguments (in this case: Formations should be simpler and grenade skill should be focused and emphasized) mixed with 95% incoherent rambling about how artillery is useless.

The “logic” is a classic all or nothing where if the artillery fails to destroy everything in its path and close combat is still necessary, therefore artillery is useless and only suitable for clunky western armies and not cunning subtle ‘eastern’ ones. He even argues that artillery and aid of artillery has not been useful in the contemporary war in Ukraine, which is… something. But not something good.

By this point Poole has lost most of what teaching value his books had, and I recommend avoiding them.

Review: North Korea’s Hidden Assets

North Korea’s Hidden Assets

H. John Poole returns to Fuldapocalypse with North Korea’s Hidden Assets, a warning about how North Korea may be stronger than anticipated. Or rather, that’s a central message in a meandering book. The content here ranges from loooong descriptions of Iwo Jima fortifications (because as a country occupied by Japan, they were undeniably influenced by its doctrine. Legit link, but not worth the obsession he shows) to constant tirades against the clunky, idiotic American doctrine and how the North Koreans have so much better military culture and small unit tactics.

Some of the book’s arguments are good. Poole spends a lot of time legitimately arguing against mirror-imaging a Second Korean War as being a repeat of the mechanized charge to take the entire peninsula that was the first. He argues and reasonably so that the north would be more likely to bite, hold, and wear the Americans and southerners down to win at the peace table. And the fortifications and tactics from the first Korean War are at least more relevant. So are the surprisingly few times he looks at contemporary North Korea (the nominal point of the whole thing)

But this book is mostly axe-grinding. It’s also hypocritical in that Poole portrays it as some kind of secret hidden source when almost all of its analysis comes from official US government documents-showing at least someone else already there knows of a worst-case perspective on North Korea. There are much better serious studies of that opponent out there.

Review: Super-Squad

Super-Squad: The Now Missing Component

It’s time to look at one of the most prolific military theorists: Vietnam veteran H. John Poole. Poole’s recent Super-Squad is a detailed call for improved light infantry tactics and a different squad organization, along with a historical study of various opponents from World War I to the present.

I may have never, ever encountered a “mean 51%” nonfiction book like this one. Poole is an infantry veteran who’s walked the walk. His desires are sincere and heartfelt, and many of his goals are valid or at least understandable. Yet there’s just so much else wrong in presentation and even theory here.

The book could probably be around half of its length and work with a concise message of “This is my proposed squad organization. This is how various limited-resource opponents across history used maneuver and skill to counter their lack of direct resources. You cannot always assume superior resources, so this is vital.”

Instead, it’s a long rambling bunch of anecdotes and illustrations, often from old field manuals. Anything that shows the “eastern army” succeeding is trumpeted. Anything that shows them failing is quickly glossed over. The writing lacks humility, to put it mildly. There are statements like “no combined infantry/tank attack has succeeded except on open terrain”, which is simply untrue. The ridiculous lumping of every possible Asian opponent into generalized “eastern armies”, combined with an obsession with ninjas (really!) doesn’t exactly help much. Neither does (especially if you want change) the constant bashing of the existing American military, something that will put most people on the defensive.

This has to be understood as being like Curtis Lemay calling for a giant fleet of super-bombers dropping souped-up nuclear weapons. If your experience involves a hammer, everything looks like a nail. Everything. It gets kind of repetitive and even a little annoying at places.

I don’t regret getting this book. As an “OPFOR light infantry tactics and case studies as written by your kooky old granddad who’s convinced he can save the economy through multi-level marketing” book, it (and many of Poole’s other books, given their similarities) works for what it is. Just don’t really expect it to be anything more.