The Second Soviet-Finnish War

Based on various general doctrine goals and precedents in similar regional conflicts, I’ve put together a hypothetical Second Soviet-Finnish War. No direct external intervention on behalf of the Finns, no other conflict it’s in the middle of to distract them.

I haven’t done any formal wargaming, but still came up with this outcome:

  1. The Soviets overrunning all of Finland in around a week, maybe a little more. I’m using their best-case on-paper rates of advance against China, which, though not a perfect analogy, was also underequipped, had lighter infantry and a doctrine focused around them, and had rough terrain in the border regions.
  2. Low/mid single-digit thousands killed (assuming a gigantic invasion force, the Finns standing and fighting, and the Soviets willing to press the attack, all of which are reasonable).
  3. Tank losses in the mid-high hundreds, with a similar amount of other AFVs. How many aren’t repairable is an open question.
  4. I want to say around mid-double digits for aircraft. That’s the biggest question mark.

The Finnish armed forces are, of course, wiped out, at least conventionally.

I’m sure this can and will be disputed. For instance, using a 30 km/day advance rate (rough terrain, NATO opponent) means it’ll take almost three weeks to reach the western coast from the eastern border. Of course, the Soviets can withstand three weeks of vicious attrition a lot better than the Finns can. They also likely wouldn’t need to overrun the entire country to accomplish their political goals, but this is a spherical cow scenario.

Soviet Planned Rates Of Advance

This covers a variety of ideal/aimed for Soviet advance rates, citing translated primary sources when possible. The actual ability to meet these rates in practice would depend greatly on circumstances. All figures are in kilometers per day.

_ _ _ _ _ _

Late 1940-mid 1950s (conventional): 25-35 infantry, 40-50 tank armies [Front Offensive Operation, 1974]

Late 1950s (nuclear): 45-60 [Front Offensive Operation, 1974]

1960s (nuclear) 60-70 [Front Offensive Operation, 1974]

Late 1960s (conventional): 35-40 [Front Offensive Operation With Conventional Weapons, 1969]

1970s-80s (Europe): 40-60, 30 (Southwest Theater, Mountainous) [Voroshilov Lectures, Front Offensive Operation, 1977 ,  Heavy OPFOR Operational]

1970s-80s (China, other weaker opponent): 70-100 [Voroshilov Lectures]

1990s-2000s (conventional, GENFORCE-Mobile): 30-40 (optimistic), 20-30 (optimistic, poor terrain) 15-20 (modest) [Generic Enemy: Mobile Forces]