Say there’s a crusty football coach who ran teams back in the days of Jim Thorpe and leather helmets. You’re at a coaches analytics and strategy meeting. There’s Bill Walsh and there’s Paul Zimmerman, talking about the evolution of the NFL. Then in comes this ninety-something coach who says “You know, you can throw the ball if you have to”, because in his time and mind, the forward pass was a novelty. But even by the start of the Super Bowl era, even in run-dominant periods postwar, it simply wasn’t.

This is how I felt when reading the New Maneuver Warfare Handbook by the infamous William Lind.

It starts with a pompous retelling of the generations of war and has a paragraph where he says “4GW” is not insurgency or guerilla war, but rather war against non-state actors. In other words, it’s not COIN/guerilla war, just war against insurgents and guerillas. Ok.

One running theme in histories of this Pentagon Reformer is that Lind, regardless of merits, was a terrible salesman. And it comes across here, where he keeps referring back to some German general or another he met in 197X and generally coming across as loving the sound of his own voice. His dismissal of every small unit encounter in Iraq/Afghanistan as “bumping into the enemy and then calling for fire” with the implication that only the equivalent of a 100% perfect never spotted run in a stealth game would be good enough for him.

Only about eighty pages of the 200 page book are the “main event”, and the amount of actual substance there is less. Lind recommends the fellow Special Tactics press books in the style of an internet video maker getting the sponsorships out of the way. Which is ironic because those, with their small and clear focuses, are the antithesis of his work. Which here involves a lot of blathering and told-you-so with a huge dose of selection bias.

The many appendices, some of which are not written by Lind, are somewhat better. It’s important to note that the themes of realistic effective training, mission type command, and even maneuvering are not necessarily bad ones (even if I disagree with the particulars). The only problem is that this is about 3% useful stuff that can and has been said elsewhere and 97% self-important back-patting. There’s a reason why other maneuver war advocates considered Lind a liability.