Courses of Action

So one of my concepts, well, anyway…

-Intact, with all the cancelled toys USSR going to finally rid themselves of the surviving Ceausescu (I’ve wanted to write a sort of “Soviet Gulf War”). Notably, the only ex-Warsaw Pact state that allows staging and troop support by this point is Bulgaria. (Bulgaria was considered the most politically reliable of them, being a longtime Slavic ally of Russia that did not experience much unrest before the fall).

-This was created using the amazing Map.Army program.

-Heavy OPFOR Operational says that high-level paradrops generally max out around 250 km from friendly troops (Which means 36 hours to catch up even under their most ideal advance rates, four days under the most ideal against a peer opponent, and at least a week under any kind of realistic resistance). The earlier Voroshilov Lectures say 150 km at most in conventional conditions.

That being said, the map!

Three courses of action. These are not specific drop zones but general guidance areas, and yes, I did extend COA 2 into the Ukrainian SSR itself. OOPS!.

Course of Action 1 (not labeled but closest to the border) is the most tame, and features a variety of tactical close-to-support airdrops in the initial advance areas. Course of Action 2 is a deeper operational/strategic drop to secure the other side of the Carpathian Mountains. Finally, COA 3 is the deepest and most daring yet and involves having paratroopers land ultra-deep to quickly establish a presence in the Yugoslav/Serbian border to try and hold off any escape or resistance aid from there.

As for the rest of the plan, it’s pretty much Soviet boilerplate-blast through, charge deep. Bucharest is going to be encircled first and then left to second-line units (including Bulgarian ones) to actually reduce. Romania’s plan in this not-unexpected event was to just stage a prolonged unconventional resistance and use their inevitable-to-be-overrun regular units to buy a little setup time.

2 thoughts on “Courses of Action

  1. If you look at your COAs another way, as close-medium and depth a general plan emerges for the use of all air-portable forces at the Soviets disposal.

    COA 1, which would encompass the immediate objectives of the involved armies, should probably be assigned to the independent airmobile brigade(s) that are at the Front and I believe each Independent Motorized Brigade also has an airmobile trained battalion.

    COA 3, the depth objectives would be for strategic purpose so should probably be assigned to special purpose forces (Spetsnaz). Depending on the specific tasks they may be outgunned but blocking mountain passes, blowing bridges etc is well within their scope

    That leaves COA 2 for airborne troops, which could be divided into multiple COAs in itself. The western end of those mountain passes look attractive for an airborne force; securing and blocking in defensible terrain.

    I see you like your new toy.

    Liked by 1 person

  2. Pingback: Soviet-Romanian War: Background – Fuldapocalypse Fiction

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